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LAWS OF INTENDED CONSEQUENCES: IIRIRA
AND OTHER UNSUNG CONTRIBUTORS TO THE
CURRENT STATE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION
Edward R. Grant"
In the motion picture based on Christopher Buckley's satirical novel,
Thank You for Smoking, protagonist and tobacco company flack Nick
Naylor is asked by his son Joey, "what makes America the greatest
country on Earth?" Naylor, exhaling irony, responds: "Our endless
appeals process. '
Whatever their view of the immigration appeals process, the
participants in this Symposium (readers included), surely do not wish it
to be endless. Rather, they would likely concur that America's greatness
is due in large part to its immigrant heritage, and that the present
challenge is to enact policies that are fair, transparent, and enforced.3
' A.B. Georgetown University, J.D. Northwestern University, Affiliated Scholar, Center
for Clinical Bioethics, Georgetown University School of Medicine. Member, Board of
Immigration Appeals, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Department of
Justice. The views and opinions stated herein are strictly those of the author, and do not
represent the official position of the EOIR, or of the Department of Justice.
1. THANK YOU FOR SMOKING (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2006).
2. Addressing the related issue of motions, the Supreme Court spoke plainly to the
incentives for delay in immigration proceedings.
Motions for reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored [by the
Attorney General and those enforcing the immigration laws on his behalf] for
the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence. This is especially true in a deportation
proceeding, where, as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of
the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.
INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (citation omitted); see also INS v. Abudu, 485
U.S. 94, 110 (1988) ("[T]he Attorney General's regulations.., plainly disfavor motions to
reopen.").
3. See generally Michael M. Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop, 8 UDC/DCSL L.
REV. 83 (2004); John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2006); Lory Diana Rosenberg, The Courts and Interception: The United States' Interdiction
Experience and Its Impact on Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 199
(2003). Few could doubt that despite its imperfections, U.S. policies toward immigrants
and immigration have singular advantages over those in most Western European
countries, where assimilation is less a part of the cultural heritage, and labor market
barriers remain a genuine obstacle even for the native-born descendants of immigrants.
See Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco, America's Immigration Advantage, WASH. POST, Mar. 6,
2006, at A15 ("[I]n countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Germany, immigrants have
no place in the cultural narrative of the nation. In the United States, immigration is at the
center of the quasi-sacred narrative accounting for how we came to be the country we are
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Some, though not all, would applaud the current generous policies that
admit or adjust to permanent resident status close to one million
newcomers each year.4 Others would argue not with the numbers, butS• 5
with the manner in which new immigrants are selected for admission.
Most would be troubled (despite significant disagreement on how to
address the problem) by the phenomenon of illegal immigration that
adds another approximately 500,000 new residents each year.' All should
be troubled by the fact that only a small fraction of final orders of
deportation and removal-entered after a hearing before an immigration
judge, with right of appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)-
are actually executed . This fact would surely not be comforting to
judges of the United States courts of appeals, who have strained in recent
years to manage a burgeoning docket of immigration cases-a
phenomenon that inspired the proceedings of the current Symposium.
8
today."). For a sharply contrasting view, see CHILTON WILLIAMSON, JR., THE
IMMIGRATION MYSTIQUE: AMERICA'S FALSE CONSCIENCE 6 (1996).
4. OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (DHS), 2004
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 5 (2006), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/yearbook2004.pdf. According to
DHS, 9,095,417 legal immigrants were admitted as, or adjusted to the status of, lawful
permanent residents from 1991 to 2000, and 3,780,019 were admitted or adjusted from
2001 to 2004. Id. For analysis of the predictability of these figures, which signify the
longest wave of high immigration to the United States in the nation's history, see Lamar
Smith & Edward R. Grant, A Permanent Fixture? Analyzing Current Trends in Legal
Immigration, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1065, 1065-66 (1997).
5. The Commission on Legal Reform, established by the Immigration Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 141, 104 Stat. 4978, 5001-04 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.), recommended "a significant redefinition of priorities and a reallocation of
existing admission numbers to fulfill more effectively the objectives of our immigration
policy." U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGR. REFORM, LEGAL IMMIGRATION: SETTING
PRIORITIES, at v (1995), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/exesum95.pdf (emphasis omitted).
The Commission recommended a core legal immigration level of 550,000 per year, with an
additional 150,000 visas per year allocated to clearance of backlogs for "spouses and minor
children of legal permanent residents." Id. at xi (emphasis omitted). Significantly in
relation to the current immigration debate, the Commission recommended the elimination
of the immigrant category for admitting unskilled workers, id. at xxiv, and strongly argued
against creation of an agricultural guestworker program. Id. at xxx.
6. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 2 (2006), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf (estimating a total unauthorized
population of between 11.5 and 12 million, with an annual increase of 500,000, based on
the U.S. Census Bureau's March 2005 Current Population Survey).
7. The ratio of failed asylum-seekers removed from the United States is as low as
3%. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT NO. 1-2003-004,
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE'S REMOVAL OF ALIENS ISSUED
FINAL ORDERS 15-16 (2003); see also id. at 7 (noting recent statistics that allege more than
300,000 aliens with final orders).
8. Neither the problem of unenforced final orders of deportation, nor judicial
impatience with the phenomenon, is limited to the United States. Mr. Justice Henry
Laws of Intended Consequences
Understanding how we reached this point-where the BIA decides
more than 44,000 appeals annually,9 and more than 12,000 of these reach
the federal courts of appealsl°-is a multi-faceted task, but is critical to
forming solutions that will ensure that immigration appeals are resolved
correctly and without undue delay. This Article will demonstrate that
the current immigration caseload is the logical consequence of a series of
decisions, including congressional enactments, administrative
regulations, and judicial opinions, which have given more authority to
immigration judges, narrowed the issues for both administrative and
judicial appeals, and streamlined a previously delay-ridden
administrative appeals process."1 To this list-critically-must be added the
Hodge, president of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, recently criticized the British
government for failure to deport more illegal immigrants and failed asylum-seekers.
Richard Ford, Britain Must Deport More Failed Asylum-Seekers, Says Top Judge, TIMES
(London), Jan. 25, 2006, at 6.
9. In fiscal year (FY) 2005, the BIA received 42,734 cases and completed 46,355
cases. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2005
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK S2 (2006). Approximately 4000 of both the receipts and
completions involved appeals from DHS decisions, chiefly family-based visa petition
denials. Id. at T2. The remainder of the receipts involved appeals from final case
decisions of immigration judges (24,349), appeals from immigration judge denials of
motions to reopen final case decisions (1,859), motions to reopen decisions of the BIA
itself (10,319), bond appeals (713), and remands from the circuit courts (1,308). Id.
10. See Filings Climbed in Federal Courts in Fiscal Year 2004, THIRD BRANCH
(Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2005, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/mar05ttb/caseload/index.html.
11. For a more critical view of these developments, see Stephen H. Legomsky,
Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 370 (2006) ("[T]he
combined effect of the Attorney General's reformation of the administrative adjudication
process and Congress's restrictions on judicial review is lethal to decisional
independence."). Professor Legomsky's thesis begs this critical question: precisely whose
"decisional independence" is to be most highly regarded in the area of immigration law?
Cf id. at 369-71. It is difficult to claim that immigration judges and members of the BIA
do not exercise their own independent judgment in the cases pending before them;
otherwise, how could one account for the oft-noted fact that certain immigration judges
have higher "grant rates" in particular classes of cases than other immigration judges?
See, e.g., Attorney General Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts, 83 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1725, 1727 (referencing a study highlighting asylum grant rate disparities).
More to the point, the Supreme Court has been consistent and virtually unanimous in
upholding Congress' plenary power to establish immigration laws, as well as the authority of
executive branch officers to carry out those laws. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S.
415, 424-25 (1999). Given the traditional sources of the plenary power doctrine-the Commerce
Clause, the Naturalization Clause, the Migration and Importation Clause, and the War Power-it
would be odd indeed for Congress or the executive branch to create a body of immigration
adjudicators whose decisions were not ultimately susceptible to review by more politically
accountable officials. It also is not remarkable that the role of courts in reviewing the factual
determinations, and in particular the purely discretionary determinations, of such authorities
would be limited. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002); Reno v. Am. Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-91 (1999); David A. Martin, Behind the Scenes on a
Different Set: What Congress Needs to Do in the Aftermath of St. Cyr and Nguyen, 16 GEO.
2006]
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simple weight of demands on the system, measured both by the growth in
illegal immigration and the availability of relief from deportation. The
good news is that despite these demands, genuine "choke points," where
matters lay unresolved for inordinate lengths of time, do not exist.
The Article will focus on two major sets of developments. Part I will
trace the emergence of a trial-level immigration court system
independent of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS). In 1983, immigration judges were removed from the supervision
of the INS, and given independent status, along with the BIA in the
newly-created Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). 2 Since
the formation of the INS as part of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in
1940, the BIA had existed as an independent entity within the DOJ to
review certain administrative decisions of the INS. 13 Since at least 1983,
all relevant administrative and congressional decisions point in one
direction: the establishment of a more independent, trial-level
immigration court with greater authority and a greater expectation of
deference to its decision-making. This should not be seen as odd. A
system involving scores of thousands of cases in which the important,
quotidian decisions are made chiefly at the trial level should be viewed as
the norm; a system in which an appellate body (e.g., the BIA) would be
expected to "do over" the work of trial-level judges in thousands of those
cases should be seen as anomalous. When the anomaly was the norm,
chiefly in the late 1990s, the result-appeals that took years to decide, and
did little to improve the administration of justice-was unsatisfactory by
any reckoning.
Part II will focus on legislative, administrative, and judicial decisions
that have created a greater degree of certainty and finality in many areas
of immigration law. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,14 while unsuccessful in its stated
goal to reduce illegal migration to the United States, 5 was more
IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 329-332 (2002) (arguing that immigration advocates should be more concerned
about substantive restrictions on eligibility for discretionary relief as opposed to expanding
judicial review of such decisions).
12. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) (2006) (discussing the Executive Office for Immigration
Review).
13. Watson B. Miller, Foreword to the First Volume of ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS, 1 1. & N. Dec., at iii (1943). "The
Board of Immigration Appeals derives its authority from sections 90.2 through 90.12, title
8, Code of Federal Regulations." Id. The BIA was formed in August 1940 and issued its
first decision on August 29, 1940. See In re L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 1940).
14. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18 U.S.C.).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 104-863, at 566 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at
1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 2-3 (1996); 142 CONG. REC. H2378 (daily
ed. Mar. 19, 1996).
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successful in streamlining the system of immigration adjudication
through the following measures: (1) merging the former exclusion and
deportation proceedings into a single form of "removal" proceedings;
6
(2) expanding the authority to remove criminal aliens without hearings
before immigration judges;17 (3) curtailing eligibility for waivers and
certain forms of discretionary relief from removal; 8 and (4) curtailing the
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review decisions made on
discretionary waivers and relief." The net effect of these changes was to
narrow the litigable issues before immigration courts, the BIA, and
courts of appeals, enabling more cases to be initiated and completed at
the first level of adjudication, and thus more cases to be appealed.
Subsequent enactment of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief
Act (NACARA) 20 and the Haitian Refugee and Immigration Fairness
Act (HRIFA) of 199821 was also significant. NACARA granted an
effective amnesty to tens of thousands of Cubans and Nicaraguans
present in the United States without the need for them to apply for
"defensive" relief in deportation proceedings; 22 this removed thousands
of otherwise contentious asylum cases from that system. Less
generously, NACARA also granted to certain nationals of El Salvador
and Guatemala the right to apply for suspension of deportation under
the prior provisions repealed by IIRIRA. z3  Subsequent regulations,
which granted these NACARA beneficiaries a presumption of "extreme
hardship," and allowed such cases to be adjudicated by INS (now
USCIS) asylum officers, further streamlined (or terminated) the pending• 24
deportation proceedings for these aliens. Finally, HRIFA granted a
path to lawful permanent resident status for thousands of Haitian
migrants who had been paroled into the United States for determination
of their refugee claims. 25
16. IIRIRA § 304, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2000).
17. IIRIRA § 308, 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a) (2000); see also Lamar Smith & Edward R.
Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking the Right Reasons, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 883, 931-32
(1997).
18. IIRIRA § 304 (creating section 240A of the INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2000); see
also Smith & Grant, supra note 17, at 917-18.
19. IIRIRA § 306(a)(2) (revising section 242 of the INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)
(2000); see also Smith & Grant, supra note 17, at 918-19.
20. Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193-2201 (1997) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
21. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-538 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
22. See NACARA § 202(a).
23. See NACARA § 203(c).
24. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.64(d) (2006).
25. See HRIFA § 902.
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The next and most frequently cited cause for the rapid growth in
immigration appeals is the BIA "streamlining" regulation-actually, a
series of regulations-promulgated by Attorneys General Janet Reno and
John Ashcroft in 1999 and 2002.26 What is often not recognized is that
the success of this procedural regulation-enabling the BIA to more than
halve its pending caseload, and more than double its production of cases-
was a direct result of IIRIRA's aforementioned streamlining of the
substantive issues to be adjudicated before immigration courts and the
BIA. The existence of that cohort of cases resulted directly from the
changes enacted in IIRIRA that eliminated certain forms of relief,
created new forms with more circumscribed eligibility criteria, and
restricted appellate review, thus creating a "closed system" of
administrative adjudication on discretionary matters previously subject
to circuit court review.
Key judicial decisions have validated this streamlined approach:
uniform rejection by the circuits of challenges to the streamlining
regulations; 27 concomitant rejection of challenges to jurisdictional
limitations on review of discretionary decisions to grant waivers and
relief from removal; 28 and an overall high affirmance rate of BIA
decisions." More recently, some circuit judges have called for greater
26. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,878-905 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1 (2006)) [hereinafter Procedural Reforms].
27. See Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that BIA streamlining procedures allowing affirmance of immigration judges' decisions
without opinion represented a permissible construction of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA)); Yu Sheng Zhang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 157 (2d
Cir. 2004) (holding that BIA streamlining regulations allowing a single board member to
summarily affirm the decision of an immigration judge denying asylum did not deprive
asylum applicant of due process); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 236-44 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (holding that the Attorney General permissibly construed INA in promulgating
streamlining regulations, and finding that streamlining regulations did not violate alien's
due process rights); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 729-30 (6th Cir. 2003) (deciding that the
regulation allowing a single member of BIA to issue summary affirmance of an
immigration judge's order did not violate the due process rights of aliens); Falcon Carriche
v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that BIA streamlining procedures
allowing bypass of traditional three-judge review did not violate an alien's due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment); Capital Area Immigrants' Rights Coal. v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 264 F. Supp. 2d 14, 34 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that the regulation streamlining
BIA appellate review procedures was not arbitrary or capricious).
28. See Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 475, 484 (4th Cir. 2006); Alvarez-Delmuro v.
Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1254, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004); Morales Ventura v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d
1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2003); Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 2003); Mendez-
Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2003); Kharkhan v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d
601, 604 (7th Cir. 2003); Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 249 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir.
2001).
29. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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oversight of the conduct of proceedings in immigration court.30 This does
not change the fact that, overall, the circuit courts are comfortable with a
system that, since the mid-1990s, has been prodded to be less "endless"
and more decisive.31
Despite the tension that such a system entails, a regime of independent
adjudicators subject to the ultimate authority of the executive branch has
served the nation's interests and immigration system well. Given the
close connection of many immigration issues to matters of national
security, public safety, and foreign relations, proposals to jettison the
immigration adjudication function entirely from the political branches of
the government are unwise and unlikely to be enacted. Similarly, despite
the undesirable conflict among the circuits on questions of law and
functional standards of review in immigration matters, proposals to move
the entire immigration docket to a single circuit court deserve the
uniform criticism directed at them by circuit judges in recent testimony
before Congress.
I. BIA "STREAMLINING" AS A CULMINATION, NOT A BEGINNING
A. The Emergence of a Trial-Centered Adjudication System
1. Ferment in the 1990s
When the author entered the government as a "general attorney" with
the INS in 1992, there were approximately eighty immigration judges and
three full-time members of the BIA. Immigration judges had been
independent of the INS for less than ten years, and were dealing, to a
mixed degree of success, with a large influx of claims for asylum under
section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Certain
nationalities, particularly Nicaraguans and Chinese, benefitted from
special "administrative review" programs overseeing the work of
immigration judges and the BIA,33 while other nationalities, chiefly
30. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828,829-30 (7th Cir. 2005).
31. See, e.g., Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 552-53 (2d Cir. 2006) ("We have
recently commented that immigration cases are not 'games.' Indeed, they are not, and we
will not, nor should an immigration judge be required to, indulge Morgan's attempts to
introduce needless delay into what are meant to be 'streamlined' proceedings.") (citing
Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA,
437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Th[e] apparent gaming of the system in an effort to
avoid deportation is not tolerated by the existing regulatory scheme.").
32. See, e.g., Editorial, Don't Tamper With the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at
A24.
33. See, e.g., Attorney General Announces New Asylum Policy Unit, 64 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 472 (1987); New Office Set Up to Review Eligibility for Asylum in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1987, at A18. DOJ's Asylum Policy and Review Unit (APRU) is described
on a current government website as "a watchdog unit set up by the Reagan
2006]
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Salvadorans and Guatemalans, benefitted from relief in class action1 4
lawsuits. Meanwhile, a parallel system of internal INS adjudication of
asylum claims seemed to be a project permanently under construction;
the promised "final regulations" of 1990"s were buried under an
avalanche of new claims in the early years of that decade, resulting in a
six-figure backlog of unadjudicated cases. 6 Aliens denied in that system
were entitled to de novo consideration of their application in deportation
proceedings before an immigration judge. During that period, circuit
courts certainly had their say in some important matters, particularly the
development of asylum law,3 7 but the difficulties of an over-burdened
system were borne primarily by the INS and EOIR judges.
The Clinton administration undertook several objectives to address the
issue, which can be divided into policy-based and resource-based
initiatives.i8 The chief policy initiative was new asylum regulations,
effective January 1995, which centered on three major changes. 39 First,
Administration to ensure that the INS did not improperly deny asylum applicants." U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, This Month in Immigration History: January 1995,
http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/history/jan95.htm (last visited July 28, 2006) [hereinafter
Immigration History]. Within the government, its creation caused consternation within
both the State Department and the INS. See Arthur C. Helton, Final Asylum Rules:
Finally, 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 789, 792-93 (1990) (describing INS acquiescence, and
State Department criticism of APRU's competence in the task of reporting country
conditions); INS Pushes Major Changes to Proposed Asylum Rule, 66 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 3, 13 (1989) (reporting that INS Commissioner Nelson asked Attorney General
Thornburgh to disband APRU). The Nicaraguan Review Program, operated in the DOJ
from 1985 to 1995, protected approximately 40,000 Nicaraguan nationals from
deportation. Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Amnesty for Central Americans?,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 5, 1997, at 3. The program required review by the DOJ of the cases of all
Nicaraguans ordered deported, even those who had presented asylum claims in the course
of their proceedings. INS Discontinues Nicaraguan Review Process, 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 83, 839 (1995) (citing country condition changes in Nicaragua and
improvements in the U.S. asylum system, as grounds for termination).
34. See Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
35. Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55
Fed. Reg. 30,674, 30,674-75 (July 27, 1990) (codified in 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 236, 242,
253); see also Gregg A. Beyer, Affirmative Asylum Adjudication in the United States, 6
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 253, 262-63 (1992); Helton, supra note 33, at 789-90.
36. See Smith & Grant, supra note 17, at 897-98 & n. 51 (citing INS data documenting
the number of new asylum claims filed from FY 1994 to FY 1996).
37. The bulk of the significant circuit court law during this period emanated from the
Ninth Circuit. See generally Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated,
502 U.S. 1086 (1992), affd on remand, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992); Maldonado-Cruz v.
INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988); Cardoza-
Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), affd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
38. See Smith & Grant, supra note 17, at 895-96.
39. See Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum or
Withholding of Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 62,284,
62,284 (Dec. 5, 1994) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 236, 242, 274a, 299).
[Vol. 55:923
Laws of Intended Consequences
applicants would no longer receive automatic work authorization, thus
reducing a perceived incentive for filing non-meritorious claims.4 °
Second, applicants denied asylum by the INS would no longer receive a
detailed notice of intent to deny and final decision of denial, but rather
would have their claims "referred" to an immigration judge for a de novo
hearing of their claim.4 '1  Third, immigration judges would "strive to
complete the adjudication asylum application" within 150 days of the
application being filed.42 To deal with these changes, resources altered
greatly: the ranks of INS asylum officers doubled,43 new hiring of
immigration judges increased their number to over 200, and eight new
members (plus dozens of staff attorneys) were appointed to the BIA in
1995.44
There was plenty of work, and then some, to occupy the new hires at
all levels. Asylum officers had an accumulated backlog to clear, although
incoming cases, as anticipated, decreased.45 Immigration judges, many of
them new to the job, had to deal with a rapid influx of "referred" asylum
claims, many of them quite dated, under a new system of deadlines.46
The Board, with a backlog steadily built during the years when it
40. Id. at 62,284, 62,290-91.
41. Id. at 62,284, 62,293-94.
42. Id. at 62,284. For a comprehensive analysis of the issues and process resulting in
the reform of asylum regulations effective January 4, 1995, see generally David A. Martin,
Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REV. 725 (1995).
43. The original cohort of 82 INS asylum officers hired in 1990 was roughly doubled
to 150 in 1992, and doubled again to over 300 after promulgation of the 1995 regulations.
Immigration History, supra note 33.
44. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals;
Expansion of the Board, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,231, 47,231 (Sept. 15, 1994) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1(a)(1)) (expanding the BIA to 12 members); New BIA Members Selected, Board
Expands to 12 Members, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 772 (1995); see also Michael John
Creppy, The Quest for Enhanced Efficiency in Immigration Courts, 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 193, 194 (1995) (describing increased hiring of immigration judges).
45. Smith & Grant, supra note 17, at 897 n. 51 (citing INS data). Numbers of
applications to INS' successor, the United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security, are also low when compared
with numbers in the early 1990s. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. RL32621, U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 13 (2006) [hereinafter POLICY ON ASYLUM
SEEKERS]. After a peak of more than 150,000 new applications filed with the INS in FY
1994, applications fell to under 40,000 in FY 1999. Id. at 12-13. After an upturn in FY
2001 and FY 2002, applications to USCIS fell to 27,551 in FY 2004. Id. at 12.
46. At the time of the 1995 regulations, there were 425,000 asylum applications
pending adjudication by INS asylum officers. Immigration History, supra note 33. As
these claims could now be adjudicated by the asylum officers under the "grant" or "refer"
options created by the regulations, and all referred applicants-would be issued a charging
document placing them in deportation proceedings, there was a significant increase in
asylum cases before the immigration judges. POLICY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS, supra note
45, at 8.
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functioned with three permanent members and minimal staff, had to
adjust to the twin challenges of maintaining an increased caseload and
attempting to synthesize the views of new members with varied
opinions.47 Then came IIRIRA.
2. IIRIRA: Enhancing the Authority of Immigration Judges
The impact of IIRIRA on the benefits available to those aliens who
are illegally present in the United States, or to those legally present and
charged (usually for a crime) with having forfeited the privilege of that
status, has been thoroughly examined, including by the author,48 and will
not be repeated here. Rather, the purpose here is to highlight the
legislation's overall intent to narrow the scope of issues (and relief) that
can be litigated before immigration judges, to give those judges enhanced
status, and to limit Article III review of their decisions in areas
committed by statute to the discretion of the Attorney General. These
changes (particularly in the area of asylum) 49 codified much of what the
Clinton administration had undertaken in increasing the size and
responsibility of the immigration judge corps. While IIRIRA was
criticized for truncating the discretion of immigration judges to award
certain relief,0 its consequences, a decade after enactment, have given
immigration judges more authority, as defined by the deference their
decisions are now accorded.
a. Limiting Issues to be Litigated
IIRIRA narrowed the issues to be litigated by immigration judges in
four principal ways, and expanded it in one-a development with
profound impact chiefly in the Second Circuit.
First, IIRIRA consolidated the formerly bifurcated exclusion and
deportation proceedings into a single form of "removal" proceeding,"
and concomitantly, eliminated the former "entry 5 2 and Fleuti3 doctrines.
47. See, e.g., In re Tijam, 22 I. & N. Dec. 408 (B.I.A. 1998); In re Hernandez, 21 I. &
N. Dec. 224 (B.I.A. 1996); In re B-, 211. & N. Dec. 66 (B.I.A. 1995).
48. See generally Smith & Grant, supra note 17.
49. IIRIRA § 604, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000).
50. See, e.g., Paul B. Hunker III, Cancellation of Removal or Cancellation of Relie.f? -
The 1996 IIRIRA Amendment: A Review and Critique of Section 240A(A) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 37-38 (2000).
51. H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 230 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
52. Id. at 225.
53. See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461 (1963) (holding that a lawful
permanent resident returning from abroad is not considered to have made a new entry if
the trip was "innocent, casual, and brief"); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225-26
(noting that the drafters of IIRIRA intended "to overturn certain interpretations of Fleuti
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Gone would be disputes about whether an alien had gained sufficient
foothold to claim an entry into the United States,54 about whether a
departure was "brief, casual, and innocent,, 5  and about which form of
proceeding was correct 56-a determination that could significantly impact
an alien's eligibility for relief. Instead, such eligibility would be
determined by whether the alien had previously been admitted to the
United States after a lawful inspection for that purpose, or had come into
the country illegally, without being admitted.57
Second, IIRIRA established a system for "expedited removal" of
aliens inadmissible due to fraud or failure to possess valid permission to
58be in the country. Unless such aliens had a "credible fear" of returning
to their homelands and sought to apply for asylum, they could be ordered
removed without a hearing before an immigration judge,5 9 thus clearing
judges' dockets of numerous and essentially uncontested matters. 60
Third, IIRIRA narrowed the forms of relief and waivers that may be
applied for as a defense to removal in immigration court.6' Most
significant for illegal aliens-both illegal entrants and legal entrants who
have overstayed-was the repeal of "suspension of deportation," with its
standard of extreme hardship, including to the alien himself, and the
seven-year period of physical presence, with "cancellation of removal for
non-permanent residents," which requires ten years of continuous
presence, and a showing of "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" to an immediate family member (not including a sibling) who
is also a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. 62  Mostsignificant for permanent residents was the elimination of INA section
by stating that a returning lawful permanent resident is seeking admission if the alien is
attempting to enter or has entered the United States without inspection").
54. See, e.g., You Yi Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1550 (3d Cir. 1995); Xin-Chang
Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 756 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Z-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 707, 708 (B.I.A.
1993); In re Patel, 20 I. & N. Dec. 368, 371-72 (B.I.A. 1991); In re Ching & Chen, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 203, 204-05 (B.I.A. 1984).
55. See, e.g., Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS, 78 F.3d 194, 201 (5th Cir. 1996); Biggs v. INS,
55 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995).
56. Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 736.
57. Smith & Grant, supra note 17, at 916.
58. IIRIRA § 302(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2000).
59. IIRIRA § 302(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii).
60. See U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 1 (2005), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/
global/asylum%5refugees/2005/February/execsum.pdf.
61. IIRIRA § 304(a)(3) (creating INA section 240A(b)), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2000).
62. IIRIRA § 304(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)-(b); see also Ramirez-Zavala v.
Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 64-65 (B.I.A.
2001); In re Nolasco, 22 I. & N. Dec. 632, 641 (B.I.A. 1999).
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212(c) relief-albeit a repeal with many footnotes due to INS v. St. Cyr63
and subsequent regulations. 4 In its place is another form of cancellation
of removal with tighter residency requirements and a long list of
offenses-known as "aggravated felonies"-which render a potential
65applicant ineligible. Just as the exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship standard for the first form of cancellation presents far fewer
"close cases" than did the extreme hardship standard, so too the
aggravated felony bar in criminal cases reduces the litigable issues
greatly, often to the point of zero.66 Like reforms to provisions such as
61the INA section 212(h) waiver have had a similar impact.
Fourth, IIRIRA imposed limitations on "humanitarian" relief-asylum
and withholding of remova168-in the form of a one-year time deadline for
applying for asylum in the United States,69 a bar to asylum for any alien
convicted of an aggravated felony,7° and a more expansive definition of a
"particularly serious crime" that will bar an alien from withholding of
removal.7' The time deadline, in particular, can significantly narrow the
63. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
64. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44 (2006).
65. IIRIRA § 304(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining
the term "aggravated felony").
66. One immigration law expert describes the provision as:
a substantial regression from the law prior to [the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)], because the law prior to AEDPA
allowed aggravated felons to apply for INA section 212(c) relief if they were not
incarcerated for 5 years or more. In addition, the aggravated felony bar in
cancellation is applicable to all persons in removal proceedings, including those
who are inadmissible. Given the drastic redefinition of aggravated felonies to
include virtually every felony and some misdemeanors, the cancellation provision
will be useless in the vast majority of cases.
IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 769-70 (9th ed. 2004).
67. Section 348 of IIRIRA amended section 212(h) of the INA, which permits a
discretionary waiver to be granted to aliens inadmissible to the United States on specified
grounds relating to criminal conduct (the waiver, however, is not available for most drug
offenses) by prohibiting aliens previously admitted for lawful permanent residence from
obtaining the waiver if they have been convicted of an aggravated felony, or if they have
not resided lawfully in the United States for at least seven years prior to the
commencement of removal proceedings. IIRIRA § 348, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2000).
68. IIRIRA § 604(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000).
69. IIRIRA § 604(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
70. IIRIRA § 604(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). Under this provision, an alien is
considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime, and thus barred from
asylum, if convicted of any aggravated felony. Id.
71. IIRIRA § 305(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2000). Under this provision, an
alien is considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime, and thus barred
from relief, if convicted of an aggravated felony or felonies to which he has been
sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 5 years or more; however, the
Attorney General is not barred from finding a particularly serious crime to exist in the
case of a lesser sentence. Id. Compare In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 270 (B.I.A. 2002)
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issues in cases where it is applied, because the standard of probability of
persecution that must be established for withholding of removal is more
difficult to reach than the "well-founded fear" standard applicable in
12asylum cases.
Still on the subject of asylum, the one area where IIRIRA significantly
expanded the range of litigable issues in immigration court should be
mentioned. Section 601 of IIRIRA, amending the definition of refugee
in INA section 101(a)(42),73 resolved a long-simmering political battle,
defining persecution on account of political opinion to include
victimization, through forced abortion or sterilization, under a regime of
coercive family planning.74 Relying on BIA precedent that was relatively
undisturbed in the federal courts, immigration judges routinely dismissed
such claims, which almost exclusively came from China.75 Now, such
claims represent a formidable block of the caseload in certain
(trafficking in controlled substance presumptively a particularly serious crime, regardless
of the sentence), with In re L-S-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 645 (B.I.A. 1999) (alien smuggling not a
particularly serious crime).
72. Compare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449-50 (1987) (asylum standard),
with INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984) ("withholding" standard under former INA
section 243(h), replaced by section 241(b)(3)).
73. IIRIRA § 601(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000); see also In re X-P-T-, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 634, 636 (B.I.A. 1996).
74. For a pre-IIRIRA discussion of the legal theory supporting such claims, see
Memorandum from Grover Joseph Rees, III, Gen. Counsel, Immigr. & Naturalization
Serv., to Jan Ting, Acting Dir., Office of Int'l Affairs, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., et
al. (Jan. 19, 1993), in 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 485, 498-509 (1993); Memorandum
from Grover Joseph Rees, III, Gen. Counsel, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., to John
Cummings, Acting Dir., Office of Int'l Affairs, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., et al. (Mar.
4, 1993), in 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 485, 510-12 (1993). This position was consistent
with the following executive branch determinations:
(1) an August 5, 1988, memorandum of the Attorney General to the
Commissioner of the Service directing all "INS asylum adjudicators" to give
"careful consideration" to applications from Chinese nationals who refused to
abort a pregnancy or resisted sterilization as an "act of conscience"; (2) interim
regulations that were promulgated by the Attorney General on January 29, 1990
[superceded without explanation by the "final" asylum regulations of September
1990]; (3) Executive Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897-98 (1990) [requiring
"enhanced consideration" be given to such claims]; and (4) a November 7, 1991,
memorandum of the General Counsel of the Service subscribing to the view that
China's coercive family planning policies constitute persecution on account of
political opinion.
In re G-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 764, 775 (B.I.A. 1993). The General Counsel's position, however,
was not followed by the BIA or circuit courts. See De You Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 805-
06 (9th Cir. 1996); Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 744 (2d Cir. 1995); In re G-,
20 1. & N. Dec. at 776-77 (pending further direction from Attorney General, BIA will
continue to follow its ruling in In re Chang, 20 1. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1989)).
75. De You Chen, 95 F.3d at 806-07; Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 752, 756; In re
Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 47.
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immigration courts, chiefly in the New York metropolitan areas, and
present some of the most vexing issues of fact-finding and credibility
determinations faced by immigration judges in any jurisdiction.76
b. Enhancing the Status of Immigration Judges
While significantly altering-and narrowing-the issues to be addressed
by immigration judges, IIRIRA also enhanced their status by making
them among the very few immigration officials designated by statute (the
sole others being the Attorney General and the now-defunct INS
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner) and specifying that they shall
not be employed by the INS.77 A brief history illustrates the significance
of this development.
The function of immigration judge was first carried out by supervisory
inspections officers whose hearing room has been restored to original
appearance on Ellis Island;78 as immigration policies changed and the
need for adjudication of deportation cases increased, this function came
to be carried out by officials defined by statute as "special inquiry
officers" (SIOs). 79  The role of the SIO was not originally limited to
adjudication functions.g Internal INS reforms resulted in the
designation, by regulation issued in 1973, of such officers as "immigration
judges."'" Yet, these immigration judges remained within the INS, and
76. See, e.g., Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2003); Jia-Ging Dong
v. Slattery 84 F.3d 82, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1996); Xin-Chang Zhang, 55 F.3d at 736-37.
77. IIRIRA § 371(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2000).
78. See Paul Goldberger, Gateway to America Is Once Again Ready to Greet the
Masses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1990, at C13.
79. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 414, § 101(b)(4), 66 Stat.
163, 171 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4)). For a thorough account of
the struggle to establish a body of immigration adjudicators "independent" from the
prosecutorial functions of the former INS, see Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung
to Black Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 453, 453-54 (1988) ("Few will dispute that
immigration judges wield great power in making decisions that profoundly affect
individual lives. Their judicial attire lending verisimilitude, they bring dignity and
authority to the hearings over which they preside. But it was not always thus. Their
predecessors as INS hearing officers labored in an uncertain and unrewarding
environment. They possessed none of the independence guaranteed today's immigration
judges; by and large, they did not command respect; and they were poorly compensated
for their efforts. The bureaucratic metamorphosis from a lowly group of INS hearing
officers to a fledgling immigration-judge organization took place within the comparatively
brief span of six years.").
80. SIOs "might have inspected noncitizens at the border on one day, on another
investigated violations, on yet another marshaled the case against a deportable noncitizen,
and on still another served as a [SIO] to adjudicate the deportation of someone who had
been investigated by their colleagues." THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A.
MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 249 (5th ed. 2003).
81. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(1) (1974).
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fought a gradual bureaucratic war for trappings such as adequate
82
courtrooms. In the meantime, the BIA had more independent status-
and, notably, the authority to act in the name of the Attorney General in
deciding individual cases and to issue legal rulings binding on the INS
and other immigration agencies-since the congressional transfer of most
immigration functions to the Department of Justice in 1940. For over
40 years-until the creation of EOIR in 1983-the BIA reviewed the
decisions of the SIOs, who had an undefined degree of independence
from INS district authorities prosecuting the cases before them, and who
were also responsible for many of the SIOs' conditions of work.8 While
the 1973 change in title to immigration judge signified greater
independence for the SIOs, this was an independence that evolved over
time, particularly since the change did not involve any change in
personnel. In this context, the existence of a de novo standard of review
for the BIA's review of SIO decisions made sense as a matter of
administrative law, especially since there was no statutory requirement
that SIOs be lawyers.
This dynamic changed-significantly-with the creation of EOIR in
January 1983, and further with the end, a decade later, of the practice of
the chief immigration judge reporting to the chairman of the BIA on
16administrative matters. As immigration judges emerged from the INS
culture in the period from 1983 to 1993, and saw their ranks swell
through the mid-1990s, their self-identity, and function, as quasi-
82. See Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 8 (1980).
83. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service-Populating a Nation: A History of
Immigration and Naturalization, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/history/
ins-history.xml. Enactment of restrictive immigration laws in the 1920s, and increased
efforts to deport unauthorized immigrants, led to the creation of the Immigration Board of
Review within the Department of Labor in the mid-1920s, to provide an intermediate tier
of review between decisions of immigration inspectors and the Commissioner of
Immigration. See id. Executive reorganization in 1940 brought the Bureau of
Immigration, including the Immigration Board of Review, renamed the Board of
Immigration Appeals, into the Department of Justice. Id.
84. See Rawitz, supra note 79, at 454, 457-59.
85. See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 278 n.2, 279 (1966); INA § 101(b)(4)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4)). However, in 1956, the INS mandated that
all SIOs have law degrees. See ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN & MOTOMURA, supra note 80, at
250.
86. Reno Names New EOIR Chief, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 790, 791 (1994). The
newly appointed director of EOIR, Anthony Moscato, was limited to that position,
whereas his predecessor, David Milhollan, had held the positions both of director of
EOIR and chairman of the BIA. See David L. Milhollan Announces Retirement from
EOIR, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1371, 1371 (1993).
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independent adjudicators also evolved. 8' The institutional memory of
having been "housed" in INS with an uncertain degree of independence
faded, and a new identity emerged. Not surprisingly, some judges began
to question the need for de novo review of their decisions, particularly
regarding findings of fact and related determinations such as the
credibility of witnesses.
8 8
While not addressing the issue of de novo review, section 371 of
IIRIRA sent a clear signal that the status of immigration judges should
be independent in function as well as in compensation structure. The
new definition of "immigration judge," replacing that for "special inquiry
officer," specified the following: that judges be attorneys; that they be
appointed and under the supervision of the Attorney General; and that
they work in EOIR, not in the INS. 9 While none of this altered the de
facto status of immigration judges, it insulated the judges from regulatory
demotions of that status. Just as important, IIRIRA created a new
compensation scheme for the judges, removing them from the general
schedule and basing their pay on a percentage (increasing with seniority)
of the highest pay for the Senior Executive Service.9 These provisions
truly made immigration judges sui generis among the thousands of DOJ
employees then charged with enforcement of the INA: they became the
only non-management officials whose status, independence, and
compensation was fixed by statute. The congressional intent was further
highlighted by the fact that no similar codification of status was accorded
those on the appellate level, i.e, members of the BIA.
c. Insulation from Review
IIRIRA's third enhancement of the authority of immigration judges
was its three-fold limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts in
immigration matters: first, by removing jurisdiction to review
discretionary decisions to deny relief, including both types of cancellation
of removal and waivers such as section 212(h), 9' as well as decisions to
deny asylum applications as untimely;92 second, by removing jurisdiction
to review orders of removal against criminal aliens;93 and third, by
87. Another part of the "cultural" change in the immigration judge corps was a
conscious effort for diversity in hiring. See Creppy, supra note 44, at 196.
88. This observation is based on almost countless personal conversations with
immigration judges, as well as comments presented during professional gatherings of
immigration judges and members of the BIA.
89. IIRIRA § 371(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4).
90. IIRIRA § 371(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (2000) (Compensation for Immigration
Judges).
91. IIRIRA § 306(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2000).
92. IIRIRA § 303, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000).
93. IIRIRA § 306(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).
[Vol. 55:923
Laws of Intended Consequences
mandating a highly deferential standard of review for administrative
findings of fact, as well as discretionary judgments whether to grant
asylum under section 208 of the INA.94 Specifically, findings of fact were
to be considered "conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary," 95 and asylum decisions
"conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of
discretion., 96 While these provisions did not single out the decisions of
immigration judges, they covered decisions made by the Attorney
General, and therefore by the Attorney General's delegates in EOIR.
Thus, the focus on fact-finding-typically a function of trial-level judges-is
consistent with the overall direction of enhancing the status and
authority of immigration judges.
The impact of these provisions has been examined at length
elsewhere, 97 and their interpretation is a topic for debate within the
circuit courts themselves.99 The focus here is on two questions: what did
Congress intend? And did this intent presage a more limited role for
administrative appellate review? Whatever their views on the wisdom of
Congress' actions in section 306 of IIRIRA, the authorities agree that
Congress intended to sharply curtail the role of federal courts in
immigration adjudication. 99
94. IIRIRA § 306(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), (D).
95. IIRIRA § 306(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
96. IIRIRA § 306(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D).
97. Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
1389, 1447-55 (2005). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration
Cases After AADC: Lessons from Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385 (2000).
98. See Kumar v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1043, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting in part) ("My colleagues grumble that an immigration judge shouldn't pretend
to be a 'handwriting expert' or a 'forensic laboratory.' But a circuit judge shouldn't
pretend to be an immigration judge. This is yet another tiresome 'example of the
nitpicking we engage in as part of a systematic effort to dismantle the reasons immigration
judges give for their decisions."' (citation omitted)). Judge Kozinski quoted from his
earlier dissent in Abovian v. INS, 257 F.3d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc), in which he listed other examples. Plainly,
the scope of review actually permitted under the deferential IIRIRA is not, even at this
date, a settled matter. See also Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 407-09 (6th Cir.
2006) (reversing an immigration judge's adverse credibility determination based on
applicant's submission of two documents found by State Department investigators to be
fraudulent; the court found the State reports to be unreliable).
99. The chief House sponsor of IIRIRA made plain that:
Appeals to the federal courts . . . should be extraordinary and limited to
situations in which there is a likelihood of a contested issue of law or fact relating
to an alien's right to remain in the United States . . . . In contrast, issues
pertaining to purely discretionary relief . . . should remain within the sole
discretion of the Attorney General and, thus, are no longer appealable to the
federal courts.
Smith & Grant, supra note 17, at 918-19.
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Three related concerns likely impelled this move: that appellate courts
had over-stepped their bounds in second-guessing the decisions of EOIR
adjudicators;' °° that three, and sometimes four, "bites of the apple" was
more process than was due in most immigration cases 101 and that
immigration judges and the BIA, while not perfect, usually "got it
right."' 0 2 Whatever specific motivations were most prominent, Congress'
actions in narrowing the issues before immigration courts, enhancing the
bureaucratic status of immigration judges, and imposing limitations on
federal court review of factual and discretionary determinations made by
those judges had the cumulative effect of enhancing the importance of a
decision made by an immigration judge in any given case, and increasing
the likelihood that such a decision would be the final one in that case.
B. The Move from Strict De Novo Review: BIA Decisions Post-IIRIRA
Grant Greater Deference to Immigration Judges
The period following IRIRA, as could be anticipated, saw increased
activities at all levels of immigration decision-making, including remedial
legislation from Congress,0 3 implementing regulations from the Attorney
General,' 4° interpretive guidance from the BIA, 0 5 and federal court
100. See Jahed v. INS, 356 F.3d 991, 1001-08 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting);
Abovian, 257 F.3d at 973-74 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing
en banc); Kumar v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1019, 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
101. "Three bites" would be available in proceedings commenced entirely with the
filing of a Notice to Appear (or its predecessor, the Order to Show Cause) in immigration
court: first bite, immigration judge; second bite, BIA; third bite, federal court of appeals.
See, e.g., Jahed, 356 F.3d at 1002 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). A "fourth bite" could be
availed by those aliens, including those who filed an affirmative asylum claim or other
petition for benefits with the INS, who were denied or referred, and then issued an Notice
to Appear or Order to Show Cause.
102. See Bing Feng Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1996).
103. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA),
Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
104. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of
Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312 (1997) (codified in scattered parts of 8 C.F.R.).
105. In re Perez, 22 1. & N. Dec. 689, 690-94 (B.I.A. 1999) (interpreting continuous
residence requirement for relief under new section 240A(a) of the INA regarding
cancellation of removal); In re C-V-T-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 7, 8-9, 10-14 (B.I.A. 1998)
(interpreting new section 240A(a) of the INA); In re Pineda, 211. & N. Dec. 1017, 1018-20
(B.I.A. 1997) (interpreting IIRIRA section 348(a)'s revisions to section 212(h) of the
INA); In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 917-18 (B.I.A. 1997) (interpreting section 601 of
IIRIRA); In re S-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 900, 901-02 (B.I.A. 1997) (interpreting revised
definition of "conviction" in section 322(a)(1) of IIRIRA); In re Noble, 21 1. & N. Dec.
672, 674-79 (B.I.A. 1997) (interpreting Transition Period Custody Rules enacted by
section 303(b)(3) of IIRIRA).
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litigation. 10 6 The focus here is on those developments, particularly BIA
decisions that: (1) established binding precedents that facilitated a more
rapid adjudication of cases; (2) lent further deference to decisions of
immigration judges; and (3) by doing so, further laid the groundwork for
a streamlining of the administrative appeals process.
Measured by the number of cases affected, the post-IIRIRA
precedents with the greatest impact on immigration judge decisions were
those pertaining to cancellation of removal under INA sections 240A(a)
(cancellation for lawful permanent residents (LPR)) and 240A(b)
(cancellation for lawful non-permanent residents). 0 7 The first form of
relief is a defense to loss of LPR status by those aliens who have placed
that status at risk, usually by conviction for a crime that renders them
deportable from the United States. The latter form of relief is a defense
to removal for those aliens unlawfully present in the United States and,
like "suspension of deportation" under former INA section 244(a)(1)-
(2), results in an automatic grant of LPR status. BIA decisions
pertaining to this form of relief will be discussed first.
The dispositive issue in most non-LPR cancellation cases is whether
the alien respondent can establish exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to a "qualifying relative": a United States citizen or lawful
resident spouse, parent, or child (under twenty-one years of age).0 8
Hardship to the alien himself or herself is not sufficient under the statute;
this is one major change from the former suspension of deportation." In
a series of three decisions, In re Monreal,"0 In re Andazola,"' and In re
106. See, e.g., Stewart v. INS, 181 F.3d 587, 592 (4th Cir. 1999); Berehe v. INS, 114 F.3d
159, 161 (10th Cir. 1997).
107. INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000).
108. INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
109. See, e.g., In re O-J-O-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 381, 382-83 (B.I.A. 1996); see also H.R.
REP. No. 104-828, at 213 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (criticizing In re O-J-O- and stating: "The
managers have deliberately changed the required showing of hardship from 'extreme
hardship' to 'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship' to emphasize that the alien
must provide evidence of harm to his spouse, parent, or child substantially beyond that
which ordinarily would be expected to result from the alien's deportation") (emphasis
added).
110. 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 64 (B.I.A. 2001) (finding high exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship threshold was not met because respondent was in good health and able
to support U.S. citizen family in Mexico).
111. 23 1. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (B.I.A. 2002) (finding that the exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship standard was not met by single mother of two young children who would
be denied comparable educational benefits, but not all schooling, in Mexico). The court
was not persuaded by the extended family's illegal presence in the United States, and
found that the mother's accumulated savings and sale of assets could ease the transition.
Id. at 323-24.
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Recinas,'"2 the BIA hewed to the clearly expressed congressional intent
that the hardship standard for cancellation should be significantly higher
than that for suspension of deportation."3 While rejecting the notion that
the hardship resulting from deportation must be "unconscionable" to
meet the standard,' 14 the BIA adopted a more stringent set of criteria
than those it had applied in cases of a prior generation (pre-1962), where
an alien was obliged to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
to himself or a qualifying family member."5
IRIRA required the BIA to interpret myriad other provisions.
Among its decisions that had the greatest impact on adjudications at the
trial level were: (1) defining standards for the exercise of discretion in
granting cancellation of removal to permanent residents convicted of
crimes;" 6 (2) determining that spouses of persons persecuted under the
Chinese coercive family planning program could benefit from IIRIRA's
amendment to the "refugee" definition;1 7 (3) determining standards for
when an alien is disqualified from asylum or withholding of removal due
to criminal conduct;" 8  (4) construing IRIRA's definition of
"conviction"; "9 (5) defining the scope of certain "aggravated felonies" 2 0
and (6) construing the scope of mandatory detention for aliens in
removal proceedings who have been convicted of crimes. 21  These
decisions were intended to create transparent standards for immigration
judges, whose decisions would be reviewed for compliance by the BIA.22
112. 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 470-72 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding that a single mother of six
children, four of whom were U.S. citizens, met hardship standard where she was sole
support for children and entire family legally resided in the United States). The BIA
noted that "[w]e consider this case to be on the outer limit of the narrow spectrum of cases
in which the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard will be met." Id. at 470.
113. In re Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 59.
114. Id. at 61.
115. Id. at 61-62.
116. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11-12 (B.I.A. 1998).
117. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 917-19 (B.I.A. 1997).
118. In re L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 653-54 (B.I.A. 1999); In re S-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec.
458, 463-65 (BIA 1999); see also In re L-S-J-, 211. & N. Dec. 973, 974-75 (B.I.A. 1997); In
re Q-T-M-T-, 211. & N. Dec. 639, 653-54 (B.I.A. 1996).
119. In re Roldan, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 517-18 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated sub nom. Lujan-
Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 227
(B.I.A. 1998).
120. In re Ruiz-Romero, 22 1. & N. Dec. 486, 488-92 (B.I.A. 1999).
121. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 803-05 (B.I.A. 1999) (clarifying its earlier
opinion in In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 387 (B.I.A. 1999)).
122. This is not to deny that, especially in fact-bound circumstances, disagreement on
application of the principles can remain. Compare, e.g., In re Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 423, 426-27 (B.I.A. 2002), with id. at 437-39 (Pauley, Bd. Member, concurring)
(disagreeing over the application of the cancellation of removal provisions in INA section
240A(b)); see also Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
[Vol. 55:923
Laws of Intended Consequences
As significant as these developments were in creating a body of
precedent that could be readily applied in review of immigration judge
and INS decisions, equally important was the BIA's perceptible move to
a more deferential standard of review, chiefly toward immigration judge
fact-finding in asylum cases. The primary example, In re A-S-,1
23
sustained the adverse credibility finding made in the case of a
Bangladeshi national alleging persecution on account of his membership
in the Jatiyo party, supporting ex-president Ershad. 114  The BIA's
decision branded as "axiomatic" its "authority to employ a de novo
standard of appellate review in deciding the ultimate disposition of a
case."' 25 However, citing prior cases, which provided that the BIA gives
"great weight" to immigration judge findings regarding the credibility of
witnesses, the BIA stated that it now would "accord deference" to
adverse credibility determinations under the following conditions: "(1)
the discrepancies and omissions described by the Immigration Judge are
actually present; (2) these discrepancies and omissions provide specific
and cogent reasons to conclude that the [alien] provided incredible
testimony; and (3) the [alien] has not provided a convincing explanation
for the discrepancies and omissions."' 26
What the ten-member BIA majority might have viewed as a modest
extension of prior precedent, the three dissenters, with varying degrees
of urgency, considered an improper abandonment of the BIA's de novo
review authority. One dissenter, while noting the virtues of transparency
and uniformity in the majority's standard, nevertheless concluded:
[I]t is not clear ...why our vantage point is necessarily less
revealing than that of the Immigration Judge and why we want
to give such great deference to the Immigration Judge, rather
than relying on our own expertise and sound, independent
judgment after review of the written record on appeal.
A second dissenter was more pointed, disagreeing that the majority's
test was among "reasonable possibilities" available to the BIA for a
standard of review, and suggesting to asylum applicants how they might
"satisfy the asylum law as we apply it at the Board of Immigration
that an alien's absence from the United States under a grant of voluntary departure or
acceptance of "voluntary return" interrupts the accrual of continuous physical presence
required for cancellation of removal); In re Avilez-Nava, 23 I. & N. Dec. 799, 804 (B.I.A.
2005) (holding that an individual "turned back" at a port of entry is not interruptive of
continuous physical presence).
123. 211. & N. Dec. 1106 (B.IA. 1998).
124. Id. at 1107, 1112.
125. Id. at 1109.
126. Id.; see also In re Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (B.I.A. 1994); In re Pula, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 467,471-472 (B.I.A. 1987).
127. In re A-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1114 (Schmidt, Chairman, dissenting).
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Appeals, which, for most practical purposes, is how we apply it in this
country.'1
28
In re A-S- followed a series of decisions, all engendering vigorous
dissents or "limiting" concurrences, in which the BIA had defined the
standards for when asylum applicants have met their burden of proof.
For example, in In re S-M-J-,129 the BIA required an active role on the
part of the applicant, the INS, and the immigration judge in bringing into
the record evidence of conditions in the applicant's native country.1 30 In
re O-D-131 held that the presentation of a fraudulent document in support
of an asylum application could have a presumptive adverse effect on the
applicant's credibility.132 In re Y-B-, issued simultaneously with In re A-
S-, further defined the relationship between the applicant's credibility
and the applicant's overall burden of proof, finding that "the weaker an
[applicant's] testimony, [even if the testimony is consistent,] the greater
the need for corroborative evidence., 13 4 In the same week, the BIA held
that the reasonableness of an asylum applicant's fear of persecution is
undermined when his family remains in their native country unharmed
for a long period of time after the applicant's departure.
1 3
1
Collectively, these decisions announced a series of standards intended
to be uniform and transparent, which, when complied with, would result
in BIA deference to the decision of the immigration judge, including,
manifestly, decisions in which individual BIA members would disagree
with the result. 3 6 While not all aspects of these rulings have found favor
in all federal courts of appeals,3 ' most have been affirmed or cited with
128. Id. at 1122 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, dissenting).
129. 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997).
130. Id. at 724, 726-27.
131. 21 1. & N. Dec. 1079 (B.I.A. 1998).
132. Id. at 1082-83.
133. 21 I. & N. Dec. 1136 (B.I.A. 1998).
134. Id. at 1139.
135. In re A-E-M-, 211. & N. Dec. 1157, 1160 (B.I.A. 1998).
136. See id. at 1163 (Schmidt, Chairman, dissenting); In re Y-B-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at
1143 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, dissenting); In re A-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1106, 1113 (B.I.A.
1998) (Schmidt, Chairman, dissenting); In re O-D-, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 1089 (Rosenberg,
Bd. Member, dissenting).
137. Miah v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 434, 439 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing the corroboration
regulations with approval); Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 2003)
(upholding corroboration requirement, but noting a three-part inquiry necessary for
corroboration); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 2001) (remanding on the
facts of the case, but noting that the corroboration requirement is not per se invalid);
Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (reiterating the court's disapproval of
the corroboration requirement); Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 283 (2d Cir. 2000) (offering a
favorable treatment of the corroboration requirement, but remanding the case on the
facts); Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2000) (disapproving of the corroboration
requirement if testimony is consistent and credible); see also Kheireddine v. Gonzales, 427
[Vol. 55:923
Laws of Intended Consequences
approval.13 The result-in which the de novo standard of review survived,
but immigration judges also knew that the BIA would not necessarily
substitute its judgment on matters within the ordinary purview of trial
courts-was another effective step in enhancing the authority of
immigration judges in individual cases.
C. The Streamlining Initiative
Congress, in enacting IIRIRA, deliberately intended to increase
enforcement against both aliens unlawfully present in the United States
and aliens who had committed crimes. 3 9 Not surprisingly, the number of
enforcement actions increased almost immediately, with a sizable jump
commencing in FY 1997 in cases brought before the immigration
courts,' 4° and a concomitant increase in the number of aliens removed
from the United States.14' As a result, appeals to the BIA grew rapidly,
doubling from 14,000 in 1994 to 28,000 in 1998.141
Neither the rules nor the procedures of the BIA were suited for this
onslaught of cases. Regulations governing the BIA required cases to be
decided either by three-member panels or by the Board sitting en banc1
43
With the exception of cases where an appeal was withdrawn and thereby
moot, virtually every other matter pending before the BIA-including late
F.3d 80, 88 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing the BIA regulations with approval, and finding that the
Board properly applied them); Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2005)
(cautioning that a credible asylum claim cannot be rejected solely for lack of corroborative
evidence); Dorosh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 379, 382 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding the
corroboration requirement); EI-Sheikh v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004)
(upholding the corroboration requirement, but emphasizing a three-part inquiry for
requiring corroboration); Gontcharova v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 2004)
(upholding the regulations, but noting that the rule depends on reasonableness of
expecting evidence); Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 326 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing BIA
regulations with approval, but noting a three-part inquiry necessary for corroboration);
Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 503 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing corroboration requirement
generally with approval, but noting also the BIA's holding that corroboration required
only as to "material facts"); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 253 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
corroboration requirement with approval).
138. Kamara v. Att'y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005); Hassan v. Gonzales, 403
F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2005).
139. Smith & Grant, supra note 17, at 915, 933.
140. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2000 B2 & fig.2 (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/
statspub/SYB2000Final.pdf.
141. OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 148, 158 tbl.40 (2004), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/2003Yearbook.pdf.
142. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals:
Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135, 56,136 (Oct. 8, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003)
[hereinafter Streamlining Final Rule].
143. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(3), (5) (2006).
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appeals, untimely motions, uncontested motions, summary dismissals for
failure to allege error in the decision below, applications for relief or
waivers of deportation where the alien was statutorily ineligible, and visa
petitions with no statutory basis-was submitted to a three-member
panel.'" The regulations also set a standard of de novo review, creating
the potential for re-litigation of all issues by the panel, including issues
not specifically presented on appeal. 145 The Board's internal procedures
were equally outdated: there were no deadlines for completion of cases
(other than those involving detained aliens) and insufficient attention to
moving cases that had been decided years earlier by immigration
judges.1 46 Significant changes in immigration law brought about by the
Immigration Act of 1990,14' a "technical corrections" act of 1994,148 the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996,141
IIRIRA, and NACARA, all raising new and sometimes complex issues
of statutory interpretation, added further pressure to the BIA's
workload.
Two misconceptions in the current discussion are that the BIA took no
initiative to address this challenge in the late 1990s, and that the
streamlining regulations that emerged in final form in 2002 were the
product of a single administration, spurred by the impact of the attacks of
September 11, 2001. In fact, the BIA first proposed the adoption of
single-member review of routine cases as early as 1996; after lengthy
intra-agency and departmental review, proposed regulations to
implement "streamlining" were published in September 1998,15° and final
regulations were published a year later. 5' The philosophy behind the
regulations was straightforwardly stated at the time of issuance:
The final rule responds to an enormous and unprecedented
increase in the caseload of the Board. The rule recognizes that
in a significant number of appeals and motions filed with the
Board, a single appellate adjudicator can reliably determine
that the result reached by the adjudicator below is correct and
144. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR: THE ABA COMM'N ON
IMMIGR. POLICY, PRACTICE & PRO BONO, RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS:
PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 9-10 (2003), available at
http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA-8mgPDF.pdf.
145. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3).
146. See Procedural Reforms, supra note 26, at 54,879.
147. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
148. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
416, 108 Stat. 4305.
149. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
150. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals:
Streamlining, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,043 (proposed Sept. 14, 1998) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003).
151. Streamlining Final Rule, supra note 142, at 56,135.
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should not be changed on appeal . . . . This procedure will
enable the Board to render decisions in a more timely manner,
while concentrating its resources primarily on cases where there
is a reasonable possibility that the result below was incorrect, or
where a new and significant issue is presented.
15
1
The 1999 regulations permitted three categories of "summary"
decisions that could be rendered by a single Board member: summary
remands in purely administrative matters; ' summary dismissals in cases
where the appeal is late, where the right to appeals is waived, where the
appeal fails to state specific reasons for reversing the decision below, and
where the BIA lacks jurisdiction;5 4 and summary affirmances where it is
determined that the result reached below was correct, that
any errors in the decision under review [are] harmless or
nonmaterial; and that (A) [tihe issues on appeal are squarely
controlled by existing Board or federal court precedent ... or
(B) [t]he factual and legal issues raised on appeal are not so
substantial that the case warrants issuance of a written opinion
in the case."'
Notably, the precise text of the order that may be issued in such cases
was mandated by the regulation.1
56
Patient implementation of the 1999 regulation meant that the BIA's
case backlog continued to grow, to a high water mark of 64,000 cases at
the beginning of FY 2001.157 The Board received appeals at the rate of
2,500 month, but generally completed less than 2,000 per month in the
years prior to FY 2001, the first year that the new rules were fully
implemented.158 Also contributing to an initial lack of impact is that
asylum cases were excluded, by internal BIA decision, from summary
affirmance, requiring that this significant part of the caseload, including
some of the oldest cases at the BIA, be adjudicated by three-member
panels, regardless of the merits or lack thereof. 9  At the cusp of
streamlining's initial implementation, therefore, the BIA had an
inventory of cases that, at its present pace, without any further receipts,
would take approximately three years to complete. In fact, due to the
dynamic nature of the growing backlog, this meant that far too many
152. Id. at 56,135-36.
153. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(2) (2006).
154. Id. § 1003.1(d)(2).
155. Id. § 1003.1(e)(4).
156. Id. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii).
157. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 144, at app. 12-13.
158. See id. at app. 10.
159. See Memorandum from Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman, Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, to
Bd. Members, Bd. of Immigr. Appeals (Aug. 28, 2000), in DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP,
supra note 144, at app. 3.
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cases adjudicated from 1998 to 2000 (the last "non-streamlining" years)
were received at the Board in 1992, 1993, and 1994.
Such a backlog-remarkably no longer a factor, as the Board's current
inventory of 27,000 cases is far exceeded by its annual completion of
more than 40,000 casesm6°-had many pernicious effects. The ensuing
delay, in the classic phrase, equated to justice denied. Decisions
rendered after years on appeal either granted relief far too late or
resulted in orders of deportation that were unenforceable due to aliens
having moved or enforcement authorities having lost interest. The
incentive to file non-meritorious appeals prospered, as those seeking
delay from deportation could "park" their cases at the BIA and
anticipate years of delay. Changes in law or personal status could require
cases to start all over again, defeating the goal of finality. The craft of
expert administrative appellate review continued, but it could not be
applied to a sufficient number of cases to call the BIA's work truly
effective.
Had the BIA been given more time to implement the 1999
streamlining rules-including a move to permit at least some asylum cases
to be amenable to summary affirmance-substantial progress would have
been made. In FY 2001, the first full year of "pilot" implementation of
streamlining, the BIA completed 3700 more cases than it received, the
first such "profit" in institutional memory. 161 The following year, still
operating under the 1999 rules but with some internal policy changes, the
BIA completed 47,000 cases against 35,000 receipts-the largest absolute_ , . 162
or percentage "delta" in the history of keeping such statistics. This
progress was being made, however, in a fast-paced environment altered
by the attacks of September 11, 2001, and impatient with the notion of
delay in removing from the United States those who had exhausted their
legal appeals to stay. Reduction in the BIA's backlog was a new
phenomenon; the story fixed in many minds was the number of pending
cases itself. In an ironic prequel to the current debate, dominated by
repetitive reports of a handful of strongly critical circuit court decisions,
debate about the BIA in 2001 and 2002 centered on publicity regarding a
160. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2005
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK S2 & fig.25, Ul fig.28 (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy05syb.pdf [hereinafter EOIR 2005 STATISTICAL
YEAR BOOK].
161. See id. at S2 fig.25.
162. See id.
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handful of its own decisions, 16' as well as the fractious nature of some of
the BIA's published decisions.' 64
All of these factors-the success of streamlining in cutting into the
BIA's backlog, the desire for more progress given the persistent size of
the backlog, and a desire for a more "cohesive" BIA membership-led to
adoption of the final streamlining regulations in August 2002. As noted,
some of the most recognizable features of streamlining, including the
authority to issue an order of summary affirmance in any case within the
BIA's jurisdiction that met the necessary criteria, were already
established. The 2002 regulation 165 added the following salient features:
" A case amenable to summary affirmance ("affirmance without
opinion") shall be so affirmed. 66
" De novo review by the BIA of factual determinations by
immigration judges was eliminated; the BIA retained de novo
review of questions of law, discretion, judgment, and all other
issues on appeal.
1 67
" Factual determinations, including credibility findings, would be
reviewed only to determine if the decision of the immigration
judge was "clearly erroneous.
'1 68
" All BIA cases would first be screened and reviewed by a panel
of members authorized to issue single-member decisions,
including, but not limited to, orders of summary remand,
affirmance, or dismissal. Orders with more explanatoryS 169
reasoning could be issued by a single member.
* Cases could only be referred for adjudication by a three-
member panel if necessary: "to settle inconsistencies among
the rulings of different immigration judges"; "to establish a
precedent"; "to review a decision . . . not in conformity with
the law or with applicable precedents"; "to resolve a case... of
major national import"; "to review a clearly erroneous factual
determination by an immigration judge"; or "to reverse a
decision of an immigration judge.,170
163. For a particularly breathless and incomplete account of the BIA's work, see
MICHELLE MALKIN, INVASION: How AMERICA STILL WELCOMES TERRORISTS,
CRIMINALS, AND OTHER FOREIGN MEMBERS TO OUR SHORES 214-20, 232-33 (2002).
164. See, e.g., In re Tijam, 22 I. & N. Dec. 408 (B.I.A. 1998); In re N-J-B-, 21 1. & N.
Dec. 812 (B.I.A. 1997).
165. Procedural Reforms, supra note 26, at 54,878.
166. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2006).
167. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii).
168. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
169. Id. § 1003.1(e)(1)-(5).
170. Id. § 1003.1(e)(6).
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* Unless "exigent circumstances" exist, all BIA appeals must be
decided within a period of 90 days from completion of the
record on appeal in the case of single-member decisions, and
within an additional 180 days when referred to a three-member
panel. 7
* The number of Board members, authorized at twenty-three
(but which had never exceeded twenty-one, and was at that
number only for a brief period in Fall 2001) would be reduced
to eleven.'
7 2
These reforms have brought us to the current state of affairs. Some
criticize the 2002 regulations, described as the "Ashcroft reforms" as
qualitatively different from those that preceded them, and responsible
for a mere shifting of the backlog from the BIA to the federal circuit
courts. 73  However, a closer examination of the history of the
streamlining regulations and statistics shows that the BIA had made
substantial inroads by the time the new rules took effect in September
2002, and that this was already having an effect on circuit court
dockets. 74 Another frequent criticism is that by requiring the entry of
"affirmance without opinion" (AWO) orders in all cases meeting the
regulatory criteria, the BIA was prevented from informing higher
appellate courts of its genuine reasons for affirming a case, thus creating
more work for those courts. This criticism is more telling perhaps, and
cannot be refuted by mere statistics. Part of the "conversation" between
171. Id. § 1003.1(e)(8)(i).
172. Id. § 1003.1(a)(1). For discussion of the reasons for this change, see Procedural
Reforms, supra note 26, at 54,893-94.
173. See Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration
Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1161 (2004). Levinson's
argument, shared by others, is that the transfer of BIA members to other DOJ positions
compromised the integrity of the Board by implicitly tying job tenure to agreement with
the policies of the Attorney General. Id. at 1163. Upon receiving his own certificate of
appointment from Attorney General Reno in 1998, the author noted that he was "to have
and to hold the said Office, with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments to the same of
right appertaining unto him ... during the pleasure of the Attorney General." As further
evidence of the "subtle" change in the BIA's degree of independence, Levinson cites
insertion of the following language into the regulations: "The Board members shall be
attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney General's delegates in
the cases that come before them." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2006). Levinson, supra, at
1161. This is hardly an innovation, as it has been the understood charter of the BIA and
its members since its formation in 1940. See 8 C.F.R. § 90.2 (1940).
174. As discussed, the BIA issued more than 31,000 decisions in FY 2001, and more
than 47,000 in FY 2002. EOIR 2005 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 160, at S2
fig.25. The aggregate total circuit court immigration caseload increased from 1760 cases to
4449 between these two years. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Rate of Appeal for BIA Decisions (last updated Dec. 7, 2005) (on file with Catholic
University Law Review) [hereinafter BIA Appeal Data].
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the BIA and the circuit courts, especially evident in unpublished remands
to the BIA, is communication to the BIA of those areas in which the
circuits require more clarification of issues. This can be as
straightforward as the so-called Lanza remands in the Ninth Circuit,
which prohibit use of AWO orders where the case involves issues over
which the circuit court has jurisdiction, as well as those over which it does
not, ' or as complex as more recent Second Circuit decisions on
credibility in asylum cases, which ask the Board to consider whether,
even if some aspects of an immigration judge's factual findings cannot be
squared with the record, other sustainable aspects make it "inevitable"
that the immigration judge would reach the same conclusion.
17 6
However, based on the author's experience in regularly reviewing new
circuit court decisions, there is no basis to conclude that the circuits are
more likely to reverse or remand decisions issued with an AWO order
than those with more full explanations.'77
175. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 924-26, 932 (9th Cir. 2004). In Lanza, the Ninth
Circuit held that an AWO order is not appropriate in circumstances where the case
involves an issue over which the circuit court has no appellate jurisdiction (such as the
immigration judge or BIA determination that an applicant for cancellation of removal has
not established "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship," or whether an asylum
applicant has filed within one-year of his arrival into the United States) as well as an issue
that the circuit court can review (such as whether the cancellation applicant has
established 10-years continuous physical presence, or an asylum applicant is credible). Id.
at 925-26. Based on the author's experience, it appears that other circuits have not shared
this difficulty, and in the context of such "mixed" issues, they address the entirety of the
immigration judge decision when an AWO is issued by the BIA. In Ninth Circuit
cancellation cases, the author's experience is that upon remand, the BIA will likely issue
an order specifically affirming the immigration judge's finding of no qualifying hardship.
176. See, e.g., Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141,144-45 (2d Cir. 2006).
177. This is admittedly a subjective, and limited, determination. But the issue of "how
much to write" is not a new one. See Ninth Circuit Tells BIA How to Write an Opinion, 72
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1512, 1512-13 (1995) (summarizing Tukhowinich v. INS, 64 F.3d
460 (9th Cir. 1995), and noting, "[w]hen the [BIA] wishes to affirm an [immigration
judge's] deportation order in a brief opinion, how much detail must the BIA include in its
opinion before it can satisfy a reviewing court that its consideration of the case before it
has been adequate? There is a conflict in the circuits on this issue").
The point here is simply that the dozens of unpublished reversals and remands to the
BIA issued each month do not suggest that all would be well if the BIA would but write
more in its decisions. The assigned error in most such cases is the BIA's substantive
decision to affirm, for example, an immigration judge's adverse credibility determination.
There is no evidence that more prolix BIA decisions defending such determinations would
change the circuits' views; nor, it would seem, should that be the case. The administrative
decision either is correct, or it is not. The argument that the BIA should return to a more
"full" or de novo consideration of all asylum claims must assume that the BIA would
reach different results; otherwise, the exercise would be pointless. However, given the fact
that the affirmance rate for BIA decisions in the circuit courts has not declined since the
advent of streamlining, there is no reason to conclude that streamlining has brought a
higher incidence of error to BIA decisions.
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There is a limit to the prudence 78-and relevance-of any further
remarks I might make with regard to the wisdom of specific provisions of
the 1999 and 2002 streamlining regulations. As the presiding member of
the panel responsible for the initial screening function at the Board,
however, I can attest that the regulations' contribution to the timely
administration of justice, and to focusing scarce resources on cases that
present more difficult issues, are both palpable. I also see daily
demonstrations of how these reforms are part of a long process,
commencing years before 1999, of giving greater quasi-judicial stature
and authority to immigration judges, of moving toward a traditional
standard of deference to factual determinations by these trial-level
adjudicators, and of narrowing some of the issues to be decided by such
adjudicators at both the trial and appellate level. Without these
developments, which proceeded from many sources, streamlining, if not
unworkable, would have been significantly less successful at rapidly
drawing down the BIA's backlog of cases. Conversely, the success of
streamlining in bringing timely and correct conclusions to matters that
had previously languished for years indicates that it has brought a proper
balance to the task of administrative appellate review. The myth persists
that, as evidenced by the results of streamlining before the circuit courts,
streamlining has had an opposite, destabilizing effect. That myth will be
addressed in the following section.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CONVERSATION, NOT CONDEMNATION
A. A Nod to the Circuits
Lest the effort to put in perspective is misinterpreted as denial that a
problem indeed exists, a few facts must be acknowledged. The
immigration caseload of the United States courts of appeals has indeed
skyrocketed, from 1757 in the year ending September 30, 2001, to 12,349
in the year ending September 30, 2005.179 Most of that growth has
occurred in the Second and Ninth Circuits, which together account for
more than 75% of this caseload.' 80 More telling, particularly for those
The preceding does not cover one significant area of error the BIA should address by
writing more in its decisions: those instances where the BIA has neglected to resolve an
issue unsettled by the decision below, or to consider a pending motion. This is not a
matter of making the wrong decision, but of failing to make a decision at all.
178. See Procedural Reforms, supra note 26, at 54,893.
179. BIA Appeal Data, supra note 174.
180. Id. The Second Circuit received 2550 immigration-related appeals in FY 2005,
and the Ninth Circuit received 6583 appeals. Id. By contrast, the Seventh Circuit, whose
decisions are frequently cited in journalistic accounts of the current situation, received a
relatively paltry 257 appeals in the same period, and its caseload has not altered
significantly over the last three years. Id.
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who have to decide these cases, is the outsized increase in immigration
cases as a percentage of all cases received by the circuits. Here again, the
Second and Ninth Circuits have seen the biggest change: from 4% in FY
2001 to 36% in FY 2005 in the Second Circuit, and from 9% to 41% in
the Ninth Circuit.)8' By contrast, the immigration caseload in the
frequently cited Seventh Circuit was only 7% of its total in FY 2005. 's
One may compare the understandable reaction to this sudden increase in
caseload to that engendered by the substantial expansion, a generation
ago, of federal drug crimes and prosecutions, a phenomenon that
continues to place disproportionate burdens on the federal courts.8 3 The
difference here is the suddenness of the increase: immigration appeals
more than doubled from FY 2001 to FY 2002, and doubled again in FY
2003.'8
Given these circumstances, the work of the circuits has been
admirable. In virtually all circuits with significant immigration dockets,
the median time between receipt of the appeal and the decision has
increased, but nowhere near the level of case receipts themselves.' 5 The
median decision time in the Ninth Circuit, for example, reached a low of
twelve months in 2003, and increased to approximately sixteen months in
2005. ' One reason for this success, perhaps ironic, is that many circuits,
led by the Ninth Circuit, have adopted the practice of summary or very
brief orders in unpublished decisions affirming immigration judge and
BIA decisions."'
The ability of the circuits to keep up with this caseload does not,
however, quell the agitation for changes that might relieve this burden.
In addressing such proposals, it is useful to recall how the functions of
those whose work is reviewed by the circuits has been altered over the
181. Id.
182. Id. This more than triples the percentage in FY 2001. Id. While their caseloads
are lower, circuits such as the Third (15% in FY 2005) and the First (12%) have seen four-
fold or more increases in the percentage of immigration cases as part of their overall
incoming caseload. Id.
183. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD: RECENT
TRENDS 7-8 (2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/recenttrends200l/20015yr.pdf
("The complexity of drug cases places an additional burden on the federal courts....
Because drug cases usually involve multiple defendants, they often require nearly twice
the amount of work for judges and more judicial resources than non-drug cases."); Diana
G. Culp, Fixing the Federal Courts, 76 A.B.A. J. 63, 63-65 (1990); Report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee, 22 CONN L. REV. 733, 847-49 (1990).
184. BIA Appeal Data, supra note 174.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Richard C. Tallman, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Remarks
at the Immigration Judges' Training Conference, Federal Judiciary Panel (Aug. 7, 2006)
(written outline on file with Catholic University Law Review).
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years, and why a system where appellate bodies need not invest undue
resources on the vast majority of appeals they receive is a consummation
to be wished, not frustrated.
B. Crisis: Perception or Reality?
The perception of crisis in the immigration adjudication system-a
perception that led to the convening of the current Symposium-arises
from several factors, some objectively verifiable in the strictest sense of
the term, some subjective, and some that approach the realm of urban
legend. As previously discussed, the federal courts of appeals have seen
unprecedented growth in their immigration dockets, none of which can
be attributed to their own actions, such as an unusual success rate
granted to alien petitioners or undue delay that may encourage the
"parking" of non-meritorious cases. These facts are verifiable: 12,000
new filings per year, an affirmance/dismissal rate of over 85%, and a
median decision time that has not greatly increased. 8 Given that some
unsuccessful applicants have lost their parking time before the BIA, and
others feel unsatisfied with the brevity of some orders now issued by the
BIA, it is understandable that they increasingly seek further review, and
the delay it obtains for them, in the federal courts. But this is not the
fault of those courts themselves.
More subjective, but to be taken seriously as well, are two perceptions:
immigration judges sometimes fail in their duty to conduct fully impartial
hearings or issue reasoned decisions in conformance with the standards
set forth by the BIA and the circuit courts; 89 and the BIA, because of the
volume of its caseload and the deferential standard of review it is
obligated to apply, provides insufficient correction of such errors.190
Reported instances of intemperate or biased behavior by immigration
judges attract a great deal of publicity, but the few documented examples
in the hundreds of thousands of full-merits decisions rendered in recent
years by immigration judges tend to be recycled both in appellate
opinions and in the popular press.1 9' Less "sexy," but far more significant
to the immigration system and, most critically, to the persons whose lives
and fortunes are at stake in that system, is whether immigration judges
188. See BIA Appeal Data, supra note 174.
189. See, e.g., Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the
Board of Immigration Appeals's Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 481, 496 (2005).
190. Id. at 499-500, 503-04.
191. See Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges' Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at Al (discussing the low number of complaints in relation to the
total number of cases reviewed).
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uniformly "touch all the bases" in rendering a reasoned decision, and
whether the BIA takes sufficient notice when they do not.1
92
Approaching the realm of urban myth is the perception of the BIA as
a rubber-stamp for the work of incompetently performing immigration
judges, and that the work of the Board is (justly so) under an unrelenting
assault from the federal appellate judiciary as a whole.'93 The reality of
Board adjudication and its relations with the circuit courts, particularly
those with the largest immigration case loads, is more complex, and
reflects a relationship not altogether different from that between the
federal courts and other administrative decision-makers.9 4  The Board
and circuit courts with heavy immigration dockets maintain cordial and
productive contact on issues of mutual concern. This is exemplified in
the concurring opinion of Judge Terence Evans of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft,'95
written following a personal visit to the Chicago immigration court:
Although I join the majority in voting to remand these two
consolidated asylum petitions for further proceedings, I write
separately to express my concern, and growing unease, with
what I see as a recent trend by this court to be unnecessarily
critical of the work product produced by immigration judges
who have the unenviable duty of adjudicating these difficult
cases in the first instance.
I wonder.., if we have a fair appreciation of the work load
and conditions under which immigration judges must work. For
one thing, what we see is less than the tip of the iceberg of an
immigration judge's work load. In the Seventh Circuit, only 6
immigration judges hear roughly 1,000 contested asylum cases a
year. That's an average of 166 cases per judge per year. Some
192. See id.
193. Sylvia Hsieh, Federal Dockets Swelling with Immigration Appeals, DAILY REC.
(Kansas City, Mo.), Feb. 7, 2006; Liptak, supra note 191; Howard Mintz, Legal Fight for
Refige, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 18, 2005, at Al; Solomon Moore & Ann M.
Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal Appellate Courts, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2005,
at Al.
194. See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
MINN. L. REV. 689, 780 (1990) (describing tension between Supreme Court's more
expansive reading of "committed to agency discretion" clause in section 701(a)(2) of the
Administrative Procedure Act and the "liberalizing tendency" of lower courts toward
increased judicial review of agency action). A similar tension is evident in several
Supreme Court decisions on asylum law that emphasize even more than the substantive
result the obligation of the federal courts to give appropriate deference to agency fact-
finding and discretion. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Thomas, 126 S. Ct. 1613, 1615 (2006),
vacating 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002), rev'g in
part 264 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992), rev'g
921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990).
195. 366 F.3d 554, 560-62 (7th Cir. 2004) (Evans, J., concurring).
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of these cases moot out.., and many end with a grant of relief.
But we only see the cases where relief is denied which leaves, I
suggest, the false impression that the immigration judges are
simply denying asylum petitions willy-nilly.
Contested asylum hearings themselves are not the sedate,
high-tech proceedings one often sees in the courtroom of a
United States district judge. Immigration judges have no court
reporters-they record the proceedings on 30-minute cassette
tapes . . . . Much of the testimony they hear comes through
interpreters. Imagine conducting hearings involving asylum
applicants from Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Yemen,
and Mauritania over a 2-week period when none of the
petitioners have a meaningful grasp of English.
Because 100 percent of asylum petitioners want to stay in
this country, but less than 100 percent are entitled to asylum, an
immigration judge must be alert to the fact that some
petitioners will embellish their claims to increase their chances
of success. On the other hand, an immigration judge must be
sensitive to the suffering and fears of petitioners who are
genuinely entitled to asylum in this country. A healthy balance
of sympathy and skepticism is a job requirement for a good
immigration judge. Attaining that balance is what makes the
job of an immigration judge, in my view, excruciatingly difficult.
All in all, considering the difficult cases they hear day in and
day out, I am of the view that immigration judges do a fairly
good job. Are they perfect? No. Should we expect their
decisions to be airtight? No. Perfection, I think, is simply
impossible given their heavy work load, lack of resources, and
the complexities involved in the cases they hear .... This court
should not be so quick to criticize their efforts.
196
Statistical evidence rebuts the notion that the BIA and immigration
judges are routinely reversed in the federal courts. For example, the
Seventh Circuit reported in Benslimane v. Gonzales that it reversed or
remanded BIA decisions in 40% of the last 136 cases it decided; 197 yet, a
circuit-by-circuit review of a similar cohort of cases issued by nine of the
circuits reveals a much higher rate of affirmance, averaging 89%.' 9'
196. Id.
197. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).
198. This summary of the reversal and affirmance rates for nine circuits, prepared in
December 2005, is based on the last 136 court decisions on the merits involving petitions
for review of Board decisions. The percentages are based on the published and
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unpublished court cases in Westlaw. The average rate for the eight circuits reviewed (not
including the Seventh Circuit) is 89% of cases affirmed and 11% of cases reversed or
remanded (123 of 1088 cases were reversed or remanded).
In the First Circuit, 90% of cases were affirmed, and 10% of cases were reversed or
remanded (13 of 136 were reversed or remanded). This list covers from Yongo v. INS, 355
F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2004), through Belguendouz v. Gonzales, 159 F. App'x 207 (1st Cir. 2005).
In the Second Circuit, 84% of cases were affirmed, and 16% of cases were reversed or
remanded (22 of 136 were reversed or remanded). This search covered from Yang Chu v.
Gonzales, 155 F. App'x 536 (2d Cir. 2005), through Kamal v. U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Service, 158 F. App'x 331 (2d Cir. 2005).
In the Third Circuit, 84% of cases were affirmed, while 16% of cases were reversed or
remanded (22 of 136 cases were reversed or remanded). The list covers from Liong v.
Gonzales, 140 F. App'x 342 (3d Cir. 2005), through Szehinskyj v. Attorney General, 432
F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2005).
In the Fourth Circuit, 97% of cases were affirmed, while 3% of cases were reversed or
remanded (4 of 136 cases were reversed or remanded). These figures span from Basting v.
Gonzales, 124 F. App'x 815 (4th Cir. 2005), through Owens v. Gonzales, 155 F. App'x 720
(4th Cir. 2005). Eleven non-merits dismissals were not included in these figures.
In the Fifth Circuit, 93% of cases were affirmed, and 7% of cases were reversed or
remanded (9 of 136 cases were reversed or remanded). This search covered from Yanto v.
Ashcroft, 111 F. App'x 776 (5th Cir. 2004), through Singh v. Gonzales, 156 F. App'x 714
(5th Cir. 2005). The affirmed numbers did not include twenty-five arguably non-merits
affirmances. In addition, the list does not include the Fifth Circuit's initial affirmance in
Xiaodong Li v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2005), its subsequent decision in
Xiaodong Li v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1153 (5th Cir. 2005) to vacate based on the Board's
further order decision, or its reversal in Discipio v. Ashcroft, 417 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2005)
to conform the case to Board precedent.
In the Sixth Circuit, 82% of cases were affirmed, and 18% of cases were reversed or
remanded (25 of 136 cases reversed or remanded). The list covers from Csekinek v. INS,
391 F.3d 819 (6th Cir. 2004), through Hana v. Gonzales, 157 F. App'x 880 (6th Cir. 2005).
In the Seventh Circuit, 63% of cases were affirmed, while 37% of cases were reversed
or remanded (47 of 136 cases reversed or remanded). The search spanned from Balogun
v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2004), through Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622 (7th
Cir. 2005).
In the Ninth Circuit, 80% of cases were affirmed, and 20% of cases were reversed or
remanded (27 of 136 cases reversed or remanded). The list covers from Singh v. Gonzales,
147 F. App'x 700 (9th Cir. 2005), through Hay v. Gonzales, 156 F. App'x 42 (9th Cir.
2005). The figures do not include twenty-seven Ninth Circuit affirmances that resulted
from procedural failures before the court or from cases in which the court lacked
substantive review authority (e.g., petitions seeking to overturn exercises of discretion),
and does not include cases that were dismissed based on a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. However, the list does include approximately twenty remands
under Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2004), in which the Board's sole error was
using an AWO order in situations where the case involved a mix of issues, some of which
were within the jurisdiction of the circuit court to review, and others not. The list also
includes cases involving remands for consideration of intervening circuit law. These
inclusions would act to increase the percentage of cases resulting in reversals or remands,
and decrease the number of affirmances. However, particularly in those cases involving
Lanza remands, they are less likely to involve substantive error on the part of the Board.
In the Eleventh Circuit, 99% of cases were affirmed, and 1% of cases were reversed or
remanded (1 of 136 cases reversed or remanded). The figures cover from Yi Zheng v. U.S.
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Recent statistics issued by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, and summarized in detail below, demonstrate an effective
nationwide affirmance rate of more than 85%.'99 Most importantly, there
is no evidence that these numbers moved in any significant direction
since the adoption of the BIA's "streamlined" adjudication system. In
fact, the affirmance rate has, if anything, increased: after dipping to 71%
in FY 2002 (down from 81% the prior year), the affirmance rate hit 83%
200in FY 2003, 89% in FY 2004, and 86% in FY 2005.
These statistics do not measure those cases in which a court of appeals
reached no decision on the merits but the parties consented to a remand
to the Board. Such cases may involve perceived error on the part of the
Board or the immigration judge, but may also involve errors in the
execution of a decision, gaps in the record, or the alien's newly acquired
eligibility for a form of relief such as adjustment of status. Statistics
prepared by the EOIR, including all reversals and remands, including
those by stipulation, account for 488 remands from the Second Circuit in
FY 2004 and FY 2005, and 1328 from the Ninth Circuit.2 1  Given the
Attorney General, 136 F. App'x 311 (1 th Cir. 2005), through Amaya La Puente v. U.S. Attorney
General, 162 F. App'x 835 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
199. BIA Appeal Data, supra note 174. The statistics establish that of cases "terminated on
the merits" by the circuit courts of appeals in FY 2005, 86% resulted in affirmances of the BIA or
denials of petitions for review, and 14% in reversals (6%) or remands (8%). The affirmance rate
was 89% in the First Circuit, 94% in the Second Circuit, 81% in the Third Circuit, 95% in the
Fourth Circuit, 87% in the Fifth Circuit, 90% in the Sixth Circuit, 61% in the Seventh Circuit,
88% in the Eighth Circuit, 83% in the Ninth Circuit, 94% in the Tenth Circuit, and 95% in the
Eleventh Circuit.
200. Id.
201. Memorandum from author to Catholic University Law Review (Oct. 18, 2006) (data
compiled by the Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, Executive Office for Immigration
Review) Lhereinafter EOIR Data]. EOIR figures for FY 2006 show a stable number of remands
to the BIA from the Ninth Circuit (933 versus 923 in FY 2005), but a marked increase in the
Second Circuit (842 in FY 2006, up from 378 the previous year). Id. Part of the explanation for
this figure is the Second Circuit's success in FY 2006 in "streamlining" its own docket, including
adoption of a non-argument calendar, in which four three-judge panels completed twelve petitions
involving denial of an asylum claim each week. See Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 145 &
n. I (2d Cir. 2006) (noting further the "inevitable" disparity in results that may occur in apparently
similar cases, and explaining that "[p]anels will have to do what judges always do in similar
circumstances: apply their best judgment, guided by the statutory standard governing review and
the holdings of our precedents"). Second Circuit judges attending an October 2006 conference at
Georgetown University Law Center sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center, and attended by
members of the BIA as well as immigration judges, stated that these procedures, among other
measures, have succeeded in cutting significantly the average time for disposition of a petition for
review in an asylum case. The judges also noted that a significant number of remands to the BIA
occurred as the result of stipulations between the government and petitioner's counsel, a fact
which is borne out by the author's experience in reviewing such remanded cases.
A total of 2239 cases were remanded to the BIA in FY 2006, up from 1638 in 2005 (80% of
this increase being attributable to the Second Circuit) and 671 in 2004. EOIR Data, supra.
According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the circuit courts resolved
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number of cases decided by those circuits during this period, these
numbers do not alter significantly the statistical portrait painted here.
Finally, statistics gathered since the issuance of Benslimane show little
change, notwithstanding the ensuing publicity of the Board's work. In
the first two months of 2006, the circuit courts issued 894 decisions
(available on Westlaw) involving petitions for review from decisions of
the BIAY A total of 148 were reversed or remanded, a rate of 16.5%.203
Two-thirds of these reversals, or ninety-nine cases, involved asylum
appeals, and approximately two-thirds of that figure, or seventy cases,
involved problems with adverse credibility determinations made by
immigration judges and affirmed by the BIA.2M Of that figure, more than
half came from the Second Circuit, which, perhaps not coincidentally,
205
issued more decisions (366) than any other court during this period. In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit, which issued 261 decisions, reversed
credibility determinations in only eleven cases, and a third of the Ninth
Circuit's total of forty-six reversals were for the BIA to consider the
impact of new circuit precedent issued since the BIA had heard the206
case. The Seventh Circuit itself issued a relatively scant twenty-one
decisions, of which it reversed the BIA decision in seven cases.' °7
If one considers, again, that the entire universe of circuit court
immigration cases is but the tip of the iceberg-the Board alone
completed approximately 45,000 decisions in FY 2005, and only 16% of
immigration judge decisions are even appealed to the Board-it is difficult
to square the statistical reality with the proposition that the BIA's orders
are "routinely nullified" by the courts.2°8 Nor is there statistical evidenceto back up the assertion that such decisions are riddled with error or that
7312 immigration matters in FY 2004, and 9782 in FY 2005. BIA Appeal Data, supra note 174.
No similar figure for FY 2006 was available at time of publication, but it seems safe to assume,
based on the Second Circuit's increased output alone, the circuit courts completed well over
10,000 immigration matters during that period. For further discussion of 2006 statistics, see infra
note 207.
202. Memorandum from author to Catholic University Law Review (Apr. 21, 2006)





207. These statistics are drawn from daily tracking by the author and BIA colleagues of
newly released circuit court decisions reviewing decisions of the BIA. Data made available just
prior to publication shows that 3831 circuit court decisions involving petitions for review from
the BIA were released on Westlaw between January I and August 31, 2006, and that 669 of these
reversed the BIA decision and/or remanded for further proceedings, a rate of 17.5%. See EOIR
Data, supra note 201. The effective remand rate is higher if remands by stipulation of the parties
are taken into account. See supra text accompanying note 201.
208. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2004).
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the rate of such error has increased since implementation of the
streamlining regulations. What does appear true is that the circuit courts
were not prepared for the changes resulting from the Board's doubling
its annual output of cases, and reducing by years the time cases remained
before it. While, as demonstrated here, this was a logical outcome of
legislative and administrative changes in immigration law, the circuit
courts are justifiably concerned at the impact this has had on their
work. 0 9
All appellate jurists, including members of the BIA, may consider an
individual decision they are reviewing to be manifestly deficient in its
reasoning or oversight of important evidence. Often, the bitterest of
disagreements flow from one's Sitz im Leben. Benslimane provides a
fine illustration. ° There, the immigration judge, in conformance with
regulation, required the alien to file a completed Form 1-485 (application
for adjustment of status) with the immigration court as a condition of
being granted a further continuance of his case."' The respondent
declined to do so, arguing that since the application had already been
with the adjudicating branch (Citizenship and Immigration Services) of
the Department of Homeland Security, it was already in possession of
212 213the government. The request for continuance was denied. The
Seventh Circuit viewed the immigration judge's requirement of a new
filing as an irrational and wholly procedural obstacle to relief that
214
Congress intended aliens in this position to benefit from; most
practitioners in immigration courts and before the BIA would view the
filing obligation as an ordinary course of business. This subtlety is lost on
those outside commentators who have cited Benslimane as evidence of• • - 215
an immigration adjudication process that is seriously deficient.
Post-Benslimane, the Second Circuit presented a far different
perspective on the need of the BIA and immigration judges to manage
their respective caseloads.1 6 The court noted:
The BIA's "streamlining" regulations were enacted in
response to a crushing backlog of immigration appeals, the
continuing existence of which prevents the speedy resolution of
proceedings vitally important to thousands of aliens, and we will
209. Don't Tamper With the Courts, supra note 32.
210. Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 830-32.
211. Id. at 830.
212. Id. at 831.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 832.
215. See, e.g., Third and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in Immigration
Courts, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2596, 2596-98 (2006).
216. See Guyadin v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 465, 469-70 (2d Cir. 2006).
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not cripple the BIA's procedures by subjecting to appellate
review internal case-management decisions far removed from
the actual substantive rights of aliens. The BIA's members and
the dedicated corps of immigration judges under the Board's
supervision should be applauded for their continuing diligence,
their integrity, and and [sic]-as is shown in the records of
nearly all immigration cases we encounter in this Court-their
earnest desire to reach fair and equitable results under an
almost overwhelmingly complex legal regime. Statutes,
regulations, and case law regularly change, and the cases before
immigration judges require subtle legal analysis as well as
robust factfinding generally dependent on credibility
assessments that a reviewing court cannot duplicate. IJs and the
BIA are to be commended for their efforts, in which the
"streamlining" policy plays an important role.217
These remarks must be considered in perspective, of course, especially
given the significant number of reversals by the Second Circuit of
immigration judge and BIA decisions involving credibility
determinations in asylum cases.'I 8 As noted by Ninth Circuit Judge
Michael Hawkins in remarks to the annual conference of the BIA in
October 2004, about 90% of the appeals from the BIA present few
difficulties for him and his colleagues, but about 10% are more
problematic. 9
Judge Hawkins' estimate, borne out by the overall circuit-by-circuit
statistics, demonstrates that it is not sufficient that EOIR judges get the
"easy" case right-even if they comprise a large portion of our docket,
which they do. Our challenge is to get better and better at the more
difficult cases: cases made difficult by the facts, by the legal issues
presented, or by the fact that an apparently correct decision rendered at
the trial level might not have touched all the bases, or even touched some
wrong ones. I am confident, though, that a symposium meeting a year or
two hence would demonstrate both that we are paying even closer
attention to the more difficult cases, and that this effort is reflected in the
opinions and results from the circuit courts.
In many respects, the "ball game" in examining issues such as we
examine today is the standard of review. For example, the Board is
compelled by regulation to affirm an immigration judges' finding that an
asylum applicant is not credible unless that decision is "clearly
217. Id.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 204-05.
219. Michael Hawkins, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Address at
the Annual Conference of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Oct. 22, 2004).
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erroneous." 220 The circuit courts operate under similar limitations: the
administrative findings of fact are "conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.
22
1
These are very deferential standards. It is clear that various circuit
judges view the terms "reasonable adjudicator" and "compelled"
through different lenses. It will always be thus. The BIA struggles to
find the appropriate level of review given our mandates from the
Attorney General and the variant degrees of deference afforded it by the
circuits, and even by different panels on the same circuit. As Judge
Evans noted in Guchshenkov, one should not expect perfection in this
222quest.
When I arrived at the BIA in 1998, we were literally crushed by an
ever-increasing caseload driven by recent immigrant surges from Asia
and Latin America, and by reforms to the nation's immigration laws and
regulations enacted in the prior decade. Our backlog increased at a level
of 700 cases per month, and most of the substantive cases I reviewed in
1998 had been with us at least since 1993 or 1994. There were no
deadlines to speak of in non-detained cases, and our case management
system merely kept track of what cases we had. The reality eight years
later-that the BIA decides more cases each month than we take in, uses
short orders (as do all appellate courts) to dispose of cases where no
substantive issues are presented in the appellant's brief, and enjoys a
consistent high affirmance rate in the courts of appeals-has not come
without cost, but is an achievement that should not be lightly regarded.
CONCLUSION
The current debate should be devoid of nostalgia. If there ever was a
time when the BIA could provide truly de novo and timely review to
each case before it, that time is long gone. There now are simply far too
many immigrants, legal and illegal, generating far too many removal
cases and far too many claims for relief, for such a system to work. The
same is true for the federal courts of appeals, which were artificially
protected from a post-IIRIRA spike in their immigration caseload by the
BIA's growing backlog of the late 1990s. Many of the most ardent critics
of the EOIR adjudication system seek expansion of federal circuit court
review in immigration matters, which could potentially add thousands of
cases involving criminal aliens and claims for discretionary relief to the
circuits' immigration dockets. Whether these proposals pass or fail, there
is no going back to a time when those dockets numbered in the hundreds
220. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2006).
221. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000).
222. Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 562 (7th Cir. 2004) (Evans, J.,
concurring).
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or, for some circuits, the dozens. Even if a large percentage of current
unlawfully present aliens received "amnesty" of some form, history
teaches that the flow of new illegal entrants, and new immigration
enforcement matters, would not be significantly reduced. The answer to
the current sense of unease about the immigration appeals system,
therefore, does not lie in those bodies-either the BIA or the circuit
courts-taking upon themselves functions customarily belonging to trial
judges and which, over the years, have become the province of a quasi-
independent immigration trial bench.
Like much else in the vast administrative and legal system governing
immigration to the United States, the work of judges is dictated by the
policy preferences of a nation that, for all its current ferment over the
issue, accepts historically high annual levels of immigration from virtually
all corners of the globe. At the same time, most recent immigration
legislation has established tougher enforcement policies against potential
terrorists and their supporters, against legal immigrants who have
committed crimes, and illegal aliens, both those who gained entry by
stealth or fraud, and those who entered legally, but who have overstayed
their terms of entry. The renewed enforcement efforts implementing
these policies simply put more cases into systems that were not, and in
many cases still are not, capable of the strain. Given these factors, those
systems have performed remarkably well, providing a level of
independent adjudication and due process befitting our legal heritage
and immigrant tradition. The premise that the current system does not
meet "minimum standards of legal justice, 22 is not borne out by the
evidence; nor does it constitute a propitious starting point for a
discussion of how those systems can meet the demands placed by public
policies favoring high levels of immigration. It is the author's hope that
the tone of collegiality evident in this Symposium remains the leitmotif of
those interactions between the judicial and administrative appellate
bodies tasked with the growing burden of immigration case appeals.
223. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).
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